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FROM REVOLUTIONARY TO PALACE
GUARD: THE ROLE AND REQUIREMENTS
OF INTERMEDIARIES UNDER PROPOSED
REGULATION CROWDFUNDING
Andrew D. Stephenson,* Brian R. Knight,† & Matthew Bahleda‡
Intermediaries in securities crowdfunding face significant requirements as a
result of the statutory mandates of Title III of the JOBS Act. The SEC, in
its proposed rules, provided structure to these requirements.  The proposed
rules would create strict requirements for intermediaries regarding their re-
lationships with investors and how they undertake crowdfunding transac-
tions under Section 4(a)(6) of the Securities Act.  The proposed rules
would also create and establish the guidelines for funding portals, a new
type of limited purpose securities broker.  While some commentators decry
the SEC for placing undue burdens and legal liabilities on intermediaries in
securities crowdfunding, the SEC had limited discretion in the proposed
rules in regards to those issues.  It is unclear what type of market will de-
velop as a result of these rules as market participants work through the
challenges and opportunities of securities crowdfunding.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Crowdfunding, the process of raising money from a large number of
people who make small individual investments over the Internet, has
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achieved massive growth in popularity and acceptance as an alternative
businesses may use to raise capital. In 2012 worldwide crowdfunding vol-
ume reached $2.7 billion across donation, rewards, and equity-based
crowdfunding.1  In North America alone, the volume of funds pledged to
crowdfunding increased by 105 percent from 2011 to 2012.2  Global
crowdfunding is projected to reach a volume of $5.1 billion in 2013.3
While growing, the amount of capital businesses receive from crowdfund-
ing is dwarfed by capital raised by businesses using unregistered securities
offerings.  For comparison, the amount of investment capital contributed
to early stage companies by angel investors in 2011 was approximately
$22.5 billion.4
In the United States, growth in the use of equity crowdfunding is con-
strained by the Securities Act of 1933 and state Blue Sky laws.5  In gen-
eral, any security sold in the United States must be registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), or exempt from registra-
tion.6  The same requirements apply at the state level.7  Legislators in
Congress and state governments have sought to tap into the resources
available from the millions of retail investors who would be interested in
supporting local and early-stage, high growth companies by exempting
crowdfunding from Securities Act and state registration requirements.  At
the federal level, Congress included an exemption for crowdfunding by
amending the Securities Act in Title III of the Jumpstart Our Business
1. MASSOLUTION, 2013CF: THE CROWDFUNDING INDUSTRY REPORT 8 (2013).
2. Id. at 9.
3. Id. at 8. Kickstarter, one of the largest donation based crowdfunding sites saw
growth from 2.4 million backers pledging $320 million in 2012 to approximately 3 million
backers pledging $480 million. See Nick Summers, 3 million people pledged $480 million to
Kickstarter campaigns in 2013, NEXT WEB (Jan. 8, 2014, 4:56 PM), http://thenextweb.com/
insider/2014/01/08/3-million-people-pledged-480-million-total-kickstarter-campaigns-2013/.
4. ANGEL CAPITAL ASSOCIATION, ACA CONGRESSIONAL BRIEF, available at http://
www.angelcapitalassociation.org/data/Documents/Public%20Policy/State/ACACongressional
Brief.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).  Angel investors are limited to “accredited investors” as
defined by the SEC.  For a natural person to be an accredited investor, that person must have
a net worth of over $1,000,000, excluding the value of the primary residence, or have an
income exceeding $200,000 (or joint income with a spouse exceeding $300,000).  17 C.F.R.
§ 230.501(a) (2013).
5. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012).  Regulation of securities of-
ferings and the licensing of broker-dealers and their agents by a state are governed by what is
known as “blue sky” law, harking back to speculative schemes in the early part of the 20th
Century that had no more substance than so many feet of “blue sky.” See NASAA History,
N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, http://www.nasaa.org/about-us/nasaa-history/ (last visited Jan 28,
2013).
6. Securities Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e. The consequences of selling a security without
the securities being registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission nor qualifying
for an exemption from registration are severe, and range from liability for rescission under
Section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act to possible criminal liability. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN,
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 41 (3d ed. 2011).
7. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.320 (2012).
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Startups Act (“JOBS Act”) of 2012.8  States, such as Georgia, Kansas,
Michigan, and Wisconsin have enacted state level crowdfunding regulatory
exemptions that take advantage of the intrastate offering exemption from
federal regulation and provide an exemption from state registration
requirements.9
On October 23, 2013, the SEC met and unanimously approved its pro-
posed rules to implement securities crowdfunding as authorized by Title
III of the JOBS Act.10  After passage of the JOBS Act and before the
proposed rules, advocates of securities crowdfunding saw the law as an
inexpensive means for small companies to raise funds from numerous in-
vestors through lightly regulated funding portals, a new type of securities
intermediary.11  However, the existing statutory scheme into which the
SEC issued its proposed rules had already established a high bar for com-
pliance by securities intermediaries, as well as for the initial and ongoing
disclosure by issuers.  Nevertheless, when compared to registered securi-
ties offerings, crowdfunding does present a new avenue to raise capital at a
relatively low cost.12
This comment serves as a follow-up to A Very Quiet Revolution: A
Primer on Securities Crowdfunding and Title III of the JOBS Act published
in this Journal in Fall 2012, following the enactment of the JOBS Act.13
This comment focuses on a few provisions of the proposed rules and their
impact on intermediaries, including registered broker-dealers and funding
portals undertaking a crowdfunding transaction under Section 4(a)(6) of
the Securities Act as amended by the JOBS Act of 2012.  Part II will cover
the proposed requirements for all intermediaries conducting transactions
under Section 4(a)(6).  Part III will highlight the proposed rules that re-
quire practices that are new or different for established broker-dealers.
8. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 301–05, 126 Stat.
306, 315–23 (2012) [hereinafter JOBS Act].
9. See Invest Georgia Exemption, GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 590-4-2-.08 (2012); Invest
Kansas Exemption, KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 81-5-21 (2013); 2013 Mich. Pub. Acts 264 (2013),
available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2013-2014/publicact/pdf/2013-PA-0264.
pdf; 2013 Wis. Sess. Laws 52 (2013), available at https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2013/related/
acts/52.  Intrastate offerings are exempt from federal registration under Section 3(a)(11) of
the Securities Act of 1933.  15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2012).  The intrastate exemption requires
that the issuer be a resident of and doing business within the state or territory in which all
offers and sales are made, and that no part of the issue be offered or sold to non-residents.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2013).
10. Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 33-9470, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
70741, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200 et
seq.).
11. See generally SHERWOOD NEISS ET AL., CROWDFUND INVESTING FOR DUMMIES
(2013).
12. See Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1457,
1470 (2013).
13. Thaya Brook Knight, Huiwen Leo, & Adrian A. Ohmer, A Very Quiet Revolution:
A Primer on Securities Crowdfunding and Title III of the JOBS Act, 2 MICH. J. OF PRIVATE
EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 135 (2012).
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Part IV will then identify critical areas in which the activities of funding
portals are limited relative to broker-dealers.  Part V will summarize the
legal liabilities faced by intermediaries operating in the Section 4(a)(6)
space.  Part VI will look ahead at what the SEC is likely to change from
the proposed rule and put forward yet unanswered questions about the
future of crowdfunding under Section 4(a)(6) of the Securities Act.
Crowdfunding was expected by some to be transformative and revolution-
ary.  However, the reality is that crowdfunding is still operating under the
terms of established federal securities laws and the intermediaries are still
financial services institutions, with all of the obligations and burdens that
attach to that status.
II. OBLIGATIONS OF SECURITIES INTERMEDIARIES DURING
CROWDFUNDING OFFERINGS UNDER SECTION 4(A)(6)
As defined by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”),
a securities broker is any person or entity that is engaged in the business of
effecting transaction in securities for the account of others.14  Any person
who acts as a broker of securities transactions must be registered with the
SEC and is subject to SEC rules and oversight.15  Over time, the SEC has
clarified the activities it deems to be broker activities that require the per-
son or entity to register with the SEC.16  These activities include receiving
commissions or other transaction-based compensation for finding inves-
tors for issuers—the activities engaged in by brokers and funding portals
as intermediaries for Section 4(a)(6) transactions.  Under the statute and
proposed rules, intermediaries would be subject to a number of conditions,
some of the most significant of which are discussed below.
A. Intermediaries Are Subject to Registration Requirements
All intermediaries conducting transactions under Section 4(a)(6) must
register with the SEC as a broker under Section 15(b) of the Exchange
Act, or as a “funding portal.”17  The proposed rules create a simple regis-
tration process for funding portals that requires filing a form with the SEC
and registering with any applicable national securities association regis-
tered under Section 15A of the Exchange Act.18  Currently, the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) is the only national securities as-
sociation in existence that is registered under Section 15A of the Exchange
14. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(4)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A) (2012).
15. Exchange Act § 15(a), id. § 78o(a).
16. See Guide to Broker-Dealer Registration, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,  http://www.
sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/bdguide.htm (last updated Oct. 6, 2009).
17. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,555 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200 et seq.); see also infra Part IV.A.
18. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,559.
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Act.19   As a condition of registration, funding portals will be required to
obtain, and maintain, a fidelity bond that has a minimum coverage of
$100,000.20  Nonresident funding portals, i.e., funding portals located
outside the United States, face additional registration requirements.21
B. Intermediaries May Not Have a Financial Interest in an Issuer for
Which They Provide Services
Intermediaries may not have a financial interest in an issuer that is
using its platform to issue securities.22  A financial interest is defined as “a
direct or indirect ownership of, or economic interest in, any class of the
issuer’s securities.”23  Those familiar with the text of the JOBS Act will
recall that the directors, officers, or partners of an intermediary had al-
ready been prohibited, by statute, from having a financial interest in an
issuer using the intermediary’s services.24  This prohibition is expanded in
the proposed rules to include the intermediary itself, by prohibiting the
intermediary and its leadership from receiving a financial interest in the
issuer as compensation for the services provided.25  This prohibition pre-
vents the intermediary from having a stake in the success of the offering,
which may bias the intermediary’s view when carrying out its other obliga-
tions, such as taking steps to reduce the risk of fraud.26  Nevertheless, an
intermediary may purchase securities in the issuers that it provides ser-
vices for, so long as the terms of the purchase agreement are equivalent to
those of retail investors and the purchase agreement is not in lieu of other
compensation.27  The proposed rules would require an intermediary to
clearly disclose to an investor the manner in which the intermediary is
compensated for its services regarding that issuance.28  If the intermediary
obtains a financial interest in the issuer during or after the offering in a
manner that could be considered compensation for services that is not dis-
closed by the intermediary, that intermediary could be subject to securities
fraud liability for omitting information necessary to make the information
provided not misleading.29
19. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act Frequently Asked Questions About
Crowdfunding Intermediaries, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (May 7, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/
divisions/marketreg/tmjobsact-crowdfundingintermediariesfaq.htm.
20. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,559.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 66,555-56.
23. Id. at 66,556.
24. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b), 126 Stat. 306, 315–16 (2012); Securities
Act § 4A(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. 77d-1(a)(11) (2012).
25. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,555–56.
26. See infra Part II.D.
27. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,555–56.
28. Id. at 66,557 (§ 227.302(d)).
29. See, e.g., Exchange Act Rule 10b-5(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2013) (“It shall be
unlawful for any person . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
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C. Intermediaries Must Provide Investors with Educational Materials
The SEC has proposed that intermediaries be required to provide dis-
closures and educational materials to investors upon establishing an ac-
count with the intermediary.30  These materials must be “in plain language
and . . . otherwise designed to communicate effectively and accurately” the
specified information.31  The most current version of these materials must
be available on the intermediary’s platform at all times.32   Furthermore,
any material revision to the information must be made available to all
investors before the intermediary may accept any additional investment
commitments or effect any further transactions in securities offered and
sold in reliance on Section 4(a)(6) of the Act.33
Intermediaries must receive positive affirmation from each investor
that the investor has reviewed and understood the materials.34  The SEC
declined to provide intermediaries with a template or model questionnaire
to be used to obtain the requisite affirmation.35  Instead, the proposed
rules would allow each intermediary to design its own process that is
suited to its particular business model, requiring only that the process be
reasonably designed to demonstrate receipt and understanding of the in-
formation.36  Whatever process the intermediary undertakes, the affirma-
tion from the investor must be received each time an investment is
made.37  Therefore, an investor who makes several investments through
the same intermediary would be required to provide affirmation of his or
her understanding for each of the investments made.
1. What educational materials must an intermediary provide
to investors?
The proposed rules identify the minimum contents that intermediaries
are required to provide in the educational materials.  Those contents in-
clude: the process for investing via the intermediary’s platform; the risks
associated with crowdfunding in general and the need for an investor to
consider whether investing in crowdfunding securities is appropriate for
him or her; the restrictions on resale of a security purchased; and the type
of information that an issuer is required to deliver annually, which must
include a notice that the investor may not be provided such information in
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading . . . .”).
30. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,556–57.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 66,557.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,471.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 66,557.
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the future.38  Additionally, intermediaries must provide investors with in-
formation regarding the limitations on the amounts an investor may in-
vest,39 and the circumstances under which an investor may cancel an
investment commitment and any limitations of that right.40
The proposed rules would also require intermediaries to provide infor-
mation regarding the types of securities that may be offered on the inter-
mediary’s platform and the risks associated with each type of security.41
Intermediaries should take care to provide adequate information for every
security it sells, because an intermediary may be deemed to have breached
its duty to provide all appropriate educational materials if an issuer sells a
security product not previously explained in the materials provided to an
investor.42  Securities professionals can imagine scenarios in which the fail-
ure to provide educational materials on a particular type of security pur-
chased by a disgruntled investor could lead to legal action under the
securities fraud rules, or could result in the loss of the exemption from
registration.43  More likely, the intermediary would face sanction by the
SEC for not complying with its obligations to conduct offerings under Sec-
tion 4(a)(6).44
D. Intermediaries Have an Affirmative Obligation to Take Measures to
Reduce the Risk of Fraud
In order to protect investors, intermediaries have a statutory obligation
further elaborated in the proposed rules to take measures to reduce the
risk of fraud for purchasers of crowdfunding securities.45  Intermediaries
must have a “reasonable basis” for believing that the issuer has met the
disclosure and process requirements of Section 4A(b) of the Securities
38. Id. at 66,556–57.
39. Id. at 66,557; see also id. at 66,551 (limiting investors with an annual income and
net worth of $100,000 or less to five percent of the higher of their annual income or net worth
and investors with an income and net worth of greater than $100,000 to ten percent).
40. Id. at 66,557.
41. Id.
42. If the issuer did not know about the failure of the intermediary to provide updated
educational materials, the issuer may not lose the benefits of the crowdfunding exemption.
See id. at 66,562.  The intermediary may face sanctions by the SEC and/or FINRA.
43. For instance, if the intermediary does not explain the mechanics of a convertible
note, a purchaser of a convertible note may bring a securities fraud claim under the premise
that the omitted information was necessary to prevent other information provided from be-
ing misleading.  This would be a spurious claim except for the fact that the proposed rules
require such information to be provided, and the proposed rules are designed with the as-
sumption that all the investors are unsophisticated and easily mislead by insufficient
disclosure.
44. The SEC has authority to pursue civil claims for any violation of any provision of
the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Securities Act of 1933
§ 20, 15 U.S.C. § 77t (2012); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2012).
45. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,556.
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Act.46  As proposed, an intermediary may satisfy this requirement by rely-
ing on nothing more than the issuer’s representation that it is in compli-
ance with its disclosure and process requirements under the Act, unless
the intermediary has reason to question the reliability of the
representations.47
The proposed rules adopt a similar approach to the requirement that
intermediaries have a “reasonable basis” for believing that the issuer has
established means to keep accurate records of the holders of the securities
it would offer and sell through the intermediary’s platform.48  Again, de-
spite the apparent intent to reduce the risk of fraud, the proposed rules
would allow an intermediary to satisfy this requirement by relying merely
on the representation by the issuer that it has established such a means of
record keeping.49
Intermediaries that rely solely on issuer representations may be ac-
cepting a greater amount of risk than that for which they are prepared.  If
the issuer fails to meet the disclosure and process requirements of Section
4A(b) of the Securities Act, the offering would not qualify for the Section
4(a)(6) exemption from registration under the Securities Act.  If the offer-
ing proceeds without qualifying for the exemption, the issuer will have
violated the registration requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act.50
Any person who purchases a security of the issuer in the offering that does
not meet the requirements of the exemption will have the right to rescis-
sion of the transaction, plus interest.51  This remedy can be severe for an
early-stage company because the resulting sudden loss of capital.  Addi-
tional liability may attach to the intermediary for allowing an offering to
go forward that is not in compliance with the conditions of the exemption
from registration.52  Given the severity of the consequences, it is perplex-
ing that the proposed rules would allow the intermediary to merely accept
the representations of issuers that they have complied with the require-
ments of the exemption from registration.53
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2012).
51. Securities Act § 12(a), id. § 77l(a).  In effect, this remedy grants investors an ongo-
ing right to “put” the securities back to the issuer.  If the investor is confident in the invest-
ment, the investor may not act.  However, if the investor loses confidence, the investor may
demand the return of the consideration plus interest.
52. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a) (2012). For example,
funding portals offering securities that do not qualify for crowdfunding under Section 4(a)(6)
could expose the funding portal to penalties for acting as an unregistered securities broker.
Id.   Additionally, it is conceivable that plaintiffs may get creative in arguing that crowdfund-
ing intermediaries are making the statement that the securities offered qualify for the Section
4(a)(6) exemption from registration, resulting in a misstatement of a material fact if that
issuer does not qualify.
53. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,556.
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In addition to the requirements that intermediaries have a reasonable
basis for believing the issuer has met its requirements to offer securities
under Section 4(a)(6), the proposed rules establish that an intermediary
must deny an issuer’s access to its platforms in two instances.  First, an
intermediary must deny access if it has a reasonable basis for believing
that the issuer, the issuer’s leadership, beneficial owners of twenty percent
or more of the issuer’s outstanding voting equity securities, or promoters
of the offering (collectively, “covered persons”), is subject to the “Bad
Actor” disqualification under proposed Rule 503.54  To satisfy this re-
quirement, the intermediary must conduct background and securities en-
forcement regulatory checks on the issuer and its covered persons.55
Second, an intermediary must deny access to an issuer or offering that
it believes presents the potential for fraud or otherwise raises concerns
regarding investor protection.56  The SEC notes that when evaluating the
54. Id. at 66,556.
55. Id. The SEC does not provide guidance on the content of the required background
and securities enforcement regulatory checks besides the requirement to have a reasonable
basis for believing that no disqualifying events have occurred. See id. Disqualifying events
include: (1) Felony or misdemeanor conviction in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security, involving the making of any false filing with the SEC, or arising out of the conduct
of the business of an underwriter, broker, dealer, municipal securities dealer, investment ad-
viser, or paid solicitor of purchasers of securities; (2) Order, judgment or decree of any court
of competent jurisdiction that restrains or enjoins the covered person from engaging or con-
tinuing to engage in any conduct or practice in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security, involving the making of any false filing with the SEC, or arising out of the conduct
of the business of an underwriter, broker, dealer, municipal securities dealer, investment ad-
viser, or paid solicitor of purchasers of securities; (3) Final order of a state securities commis-
sion, state banking regulator, state insurance commission, federal banking regulator, the U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, or the National Credit Union Administration that
bars the covered person from association with any entity regulated by such commission, au-
thority, agency, or officer; engaging in the business of securities, insurance or banking; engag-
ing in savings association or credit union activities; or that constitutes a final order based on a
violation of any law or regulation that prohibits fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive con-
duct; (4) Order of the SEC entered pursuant to Section 15(b) or 15B(c) of the Securities
Exchange Act, or Section 203(e) or (f) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 that suspends
or revokes the covered person’s registration as a broker, dealer, municipal securities dealer
or investment adviser; places limitations on the activities, functions or operations of the cov-
ered person; or bars the covered person from being associated with any entity or participat-
ing in the offering of any penny stock; (5) Order of the SEC that orders the covered person
to cease and desist from committing or causing a violation of or future violation of any scien-
ter-based anti-fraud provision of the federal securities laws; or Section 5 of the Securities
Act; (6) Suspension or expulsion from membership in, or suspension or bar from association
with a member of, a registered national securities exchange or a registered national or affili-
ated securities association for any act or omission to act constituting conduct inconsistent
with just and equitable principals of trade; (7) Participation in any registration statement or
Regulation A offering statements filed with the SEC that was the subject of a refusal order,
stop order, or order suspending the Regulation A exemption; (8) United States Postal Ser-
vice false representation order, or any temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction
with respect to conduct alleged by the United States Postal Service to constitute a scheme or
device for obtaining money or property through the mail by means of false representations.
Id. at 66,562–63.
56. Id. at 66,556.
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belief that an issuer presents the potential for fraud, the intermediary
would not be required to have a reasonable basis for its belief.57  In this
way, the SEC grants significant discretion to each intermediary to screen
issuers and protect investors.58  However, if the intermediary is unable to
adequately assess the risk of fraud of the issuer—e.g., if results from back-
ground or securities regulatory history checks are not available to the in-
termediary—then the intermediary must deny the issuer access to the
platform.59  If the intermediary becomes aware of the potential for fraud
only after granting an issuer access to its platforms, any associated offer-
ings must be canceled and any funds that have been committed by inves-
tors must be returned.60
III. LIMITATIONS ON TRADITIONAL BROKER-DEALER ACTIVITY WHEN
BROKERS CONDUCT SECTION 4(A)(6) OFFERINGS
The proposed rules place several restrictions and obligations on tradi-
tional broker-dealer activities when they act as an intermediary in a securi-
ties offering conducted under Section 4(a)(6).  The restrictions and
obligations include prohibiting broker-dealers from engaging in activities
they are permitted to do when acting as an intermediary in other securities
offerings, positive requirements in regards to their relationship with inves-
tors, and strict regulations on broker-dealer conduct during a Section
4(a)(6) offering.  In many cases, it appears the SEC has built upon the
rules and guidelines established by FINRA.
A. Prohibitions on Certain Broker-Dealer Activities
The first prohibition on broker-dealer activity is a subtle one, perhaps
easily missed.  Because all Section 4(a)(6) offerings must be conducted via
a “platform,”61 and platforms are exclusively “Internet Web sites or other
similar electronic medium,”62 broker-dealers without a web presence are
forbidden from intermediating a Section 4(a)(6) offering.  While this ulti-
mately may not matter given the ubiquity and relative ease of creating
such a platform, nonetheless this does represent a unique limit on tradi-
tional broker-dealer activity, which typically can be carried out through
any means of communication.
One of the more striking limitations is the prohibition on broker-deal-
ers, as well as their officers, directors, or partners from having a financial
interest in an issuer using the broker-dealer’s services, or receiving a finan-
cial interest as compensation for services provided.63  This prohibition is
57. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,463.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 66,552.
62. Id.
63. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,555–56.
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significant in the context of early-stage companies that may not have the
resources to compensate a broker-dealer.  In such a situation, it is typical
for a broker-dealer to receive warrants or carried interest in future profits
of the securities issued.  The statutory language of the JOBS Act did not
include this prohibition.  Instead, the statute only prohibited financial in-
terests or financial interest as compensation by the officers, directors, part-
ners and those similarly situated to the broker-dealer.64  The SEC argues
that the expansion of the prohibition is consistent with the purpose of the
JOBS Act to prevent conflicts of interest that may arise when persons, or
in this case entities, facilitating the crowdfunding raise have a financial
stake in the outcome.65  This position was opposed by some commenters
who felt that, with proper safeguards, having the intermediary take a fi-
nancial interest in the issuer may help align the intermediaries’ interest
with the rest of the investors.66
B. Enhanced Regulation of Broker-Dealer Conduct
In addition to the unique prohibitions on otherwise allowed broker-
dealer activity, the proposed Regulation Crowdfunding represents a con-
siderable amount of SEC micromanagement of broker-dealer activity pre-
viously only governed by FINRA rules and guidance.  These new, strict,
and specific requirements touch on many aspects of the lifecycle of the
Section 4(a)(6) raise, from customer sign-up to the completion of the
investment.
1. Issuer screening
Under traditional FINRA rules broker-dealers have a responsibility to
exercise due diligence on potential issuers to prevent frauds.67  In practice,
this requirement is meant to protect the investor customers of the broker-
dealer and falls under the suitability obligation.68  Broker-dealers, when
facilitating transactions of non-registered securities must conduct a reason-
able investigation into: (1) the issuer and its management, (2) the business
prospects of the issuer, (3) the assets held or to be acquired by the issuer,
(4) the claims being made, and (5) the intended use of proceeds of the
offering.69  In the proposed rules, however, the SEC creates a positive ob-
ligation for broker-dealers to examine the issuer for the sake of ensuring
the issuer itself is qualified to offer securities under Section 4(a)(6).
Under the proposed rules, broker-dealers must have a reasonable basis to
believe that the issuer has followed the requirements to comply with their
64. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b), 126 Stat. 306, 315-16 (2012).
65. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,461.
66. See id. at 66,460–61 & nn.340–41.
67. See FINRA Manual, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH. [hereinafter FINRA Manual], availa-
ble at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_viewall.html?rbid=2403&element_id=607
(last visited Feb. 1, 2014) (Rules 2010, 2020, 2111, and 2310).
68. Id. (Rule 2111).
69. See id.
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obligations under Section 4(a)(6),70 and established means to keep accu-
rate records of the holder of the securities that would be offered for sale
through the platform.71  This required investigation into the issuer’s busi-
ness practices and capabilities is unique to Section 4(a)(6) offerings.
2. Knowing and educating the customer
In its proposed rules, the SEC is also seeking to regulate the relation-
ship between broker-dealers and investors to a much greater degree than
in other types of securities offerings.  The proposed rules appear to envi-
sion broker-dealers encountering novice investors without prior experi-
ence with securities intermediaries.72  Previously, established broker-
dealers have faced FINRA requirements to know their customers and
have a reasonable basis to believe that recommended securities are suita-
ble for the customer.73  Broker-dealers participating in Section 4(a)(6) of-
ferings must go beyond merely knowing the customer and additionally
must educate the customer.  This new standard creates additional respon-
sibilities and burdens that could become a point of contention between
broker-dealers and unsatisfied clients.74
Under the proposed rules, broker-dealers are required to provide in-
vestors with current and accurate educational materials at the time inves-
tors create their account, the contents of which are spelled out in far
greater detail75 than is applicable for other types of offerings,76 and they
must notify their customers if there is a material change in the information
provided.77  Broker-dealers must also disclose to customers at the time
they sign up the manner in which the broker-dealers are compensated for
the sale of securities,78 and promoters for issuers must disclose their pro-
motional activities.79  The proposed rules would require investors to re-
present that they have reviewed and understood all of the provided
information prior to making any investment commitment, adding to the
recordkeeping requirements for established broker-dealers.
Recordkeeping on customers in Section 4(a)(6) transactions goes be-
yond passive data collection and storage.  While broker-dealers in other
contexts have a requirement to know their customer80 and act accord-
70. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,556.
71. Id.
72. It is unclear how the proposed customer signup rules will apply to broker-dealers
offering securities under Section 4(a)(6) to investors who have been customers of the broker-
dealer prior to the effectiveness of the crowdfunding regulations.
73. See FINRA Manual, supra note 66 (Rule 21111).
74. See supra Part II.C.
75. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,556.
76. See FINRA Manual, supra note 66 (Rule 2267).
77. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,556.
78. Id. at 66,557.
79. Id.
80. See FINRA Manual, supra note 67 (Rules 2090, 2111).
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ingly,81 broker-dealers generally accept their customers as they find them.
In the proposed rules, the SEC is expecting the broker-dealer to take ac-
tive steps to both monitor investors’ investment activity to ensure they
have not exceeded their limit and take proactive steps to educate inves-
tors.82   The proposed rules place the responsibility for ensuring that indi-
vidual investors have not exceeded their yearly investing limits in Section
4(a)(6) securities on broker-dealers by requiring that they have a reasona-
ble basis for believing that the investor is within his or her limit.83  While
the broker-dealer is allowed to rely on the investor’s representations that
they have not exceeded their limit, the broker-dealer must have a reasona-
ble basis for that reliance.84  For instance, if the investor has exceeded his
or her annual limit just with the broker-dealer in question, relying on an
investor’s representation that the investor has not exceeded the limit will
not be reasonable.
3. Facilitating the offering
After the broker-dealer has complied with the requirements for
onboarding issuers and potential investors, it must be certain it performs
the necessary actions to facilitate the raise, many of which are unique to
Section 4(a)(6).  The proposed rules include specific directives regarding
information that must be provided to investors, communications between
investors, and communications between investors and the broker-dealer.
Broker-dealers are responsible for providing both the SEC and poten-
tial investors in a given issue the information required to be provided by
that issuer under proposed Rules 201 and 203(a).85  This information must
be provided to the public on the intermediary’s platform for a minimum of
21 days before closing.86  The SEC further proposes that the information
be provided in a way that allows it to be downloaded and stored, and ac-
cess to the information cannot be conditioned on having an account with
the broker-dealer.87  The requirement to provide a prescribed set of infor-
mation to the general public and file it with the SEC is justified by the
SEC as a way to ensure that the SEC, FINRA, state regulators, and other
interested entities get access to information necessary without any undue
impediment.88  Additionally, the availability of the information, according
to the SEC, should ensure that investors have adequate opportunity to
evaluate the investment opportunity.89  As a result, the broker-dealer in a
81. Id. (Rule 2090).
82. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,557.
83. See id.; JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(a)(6)(B), 126 Stat. 306, 315 (2012).
84. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,557.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 66,469.
89. Id.
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Section 4(a)(6) offering will not have any control over the dissemination
of offering materials and will be unable to effectively require confidential-
ity agreements by prospective investors if the offering materials contain
sensitive information.90
The proposed rules also require the broker-dealers to create online
platforms and communication channels for its account holders to commu-
nicate, both with the issuer and each other.91  These communication chan-
nels must be visible to the public as well, but commenting is restricted to
people who have created accounts with the broker-dealer.92  This require-
ment that broker-dealers facilitate a public conversation is not found in
the JOBS Act; rather the SEC proposed this requirement because it be-
lieves that it would provide a central and transparent way for interested
parties to discuss the offering and a single place to get all information
about an offering.93
Under the proposed rules broker-dealers who choose to participate in
Section 4(a)(6) offerings will find themselves somewhat limited in their
business practices and compelled to take a much more active role guiding
potential investors through the investment crowdfunding process.  They
will be required to provide additional and more specific information to the
public than previously required, and will need to create technological ca-
pability to facilitate discussion regarding an issuance that is viable by the
general public.  It remains to be seen whether broker-dealers will consider
the loss of business flexibility and additional effort and expense to be
worth participating in the crowdfunding space.
IV. OBLIGATIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF FUNDING PORTALS IN THE
COURSE OF A SECURITIES OFFERING
As stated above, the Section 4(a)(6) exemption from registration under
the Securities Act requires that all crowdfunding offerings be conducted
through a broker or funding portal.94  Funding portals, but for the exemp-
tion from registration set out in the JOBS Act, would be required to fully
register with the SEC as brokers.95  In exchange for receiving reduced re-
gistration requirements, funding portals are strictly limited in their
activities.
90. There is a great deal of information that issuers are not required to disclose under
the proposed rules that would be important to the average investor—material contracts, in-
tellectual property, etc.—but that issuers might view as confidential and not want to disclose
publicly.  If the issuer provides this sensitive information in the offering materials, in-
termediaries would not be able to restrict access to only those investors that have signed
confidentiality agreements.
91. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,557.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 66,471-72.
94. Securities Act of 1933 § 4A(a)(6)(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(6)(c) (2012) (as
amended by section 302(b) of the JOBS Act).
95. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,483.
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A. Funding Portals are Limited Purpose Brokers That May Only Deal
in Section 4(a)(6) Securities
Congress directed the SEC to create a new type of regulated entity
called a funding portal.96  According to the JOBS Act, a funding portal is
defined as any person acting as an intermediary in a transaction involving
the sale of securities for the account of others, solely pursuant to the
crowdfunding exemption of Section 4(a)(6) of the Securities Act.97  The
SEC notes that the required activities of funding portals bring funding
portals within the definition of “broker” under the Exchange Act.98  Such
activities include effecting transactions in securities for the account of
others by ensuring that investors comply with the conditions of Section
4(a)(6), making the securities available for purchase through the funding
portal, and ensuring the proper transfer of funds and securities.99  In the
proposed rules, the SEC emphasized its position that funding portals are,
in-fact, limited purpose brokers by substituting the word “broker” for the
word “person” in the definition.100
1. Other activities of funding portals that would not result in the loss of
funding portal status
While funding portals are limited purpose brokers, the limitations
placed on them are similar to the limitations on securities “bulletin
boards” that avoid SEC registration as brokers.  In order to avoid trigger-
ing the registration requirements for brokers, a bulletin board may post
the availability of securities for purchase so long as it does not:
(1) provide advice about the merits of particular opportunities and ventures;
(2) receive compensation from [listing companies] other than nominal, flat
fees to cover administrative costs and that such fees will not be made contin-
gent upon the outcome or completion of any securities transaction resulting
from a listing on the [bulletin board]; (3) participate in any negotiations be-
tween investors and listing companies; (4) directly assist investors or listing
companies with the completion of any transaction, for example, through the
provision of closing documentation or paid referrals to attorneys or other pro-
96. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 304(a)(2), 126 Stat. 306, 322 (2012).
97. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(80), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(80) (2012).
98. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,483.
99. Id. at 66,483–84.  Proposed Rule 402(a) sets out specific prohibitions for funding
portals.  Funding portals may not:
Offer investment advice or recommendations; solicit purchases, sales, or offers to buy
the securities offered or displayed on its platform or portal; compensate employees,
agents, or other persons for such solicitation or based on the sale of securities displayed
or referenced on its platform or portal; hold, manage, possess, or otherwise handle inves-
tor funds or securities; or engage in such other activities as the Commission, by rule,
determines appropriate.
Id. at 66,560.
100. Id. at 66,556 (“Funding portal means a broker acting as an intermediary in a trans-
action involving the offer or sale of securities in reliance on Section 4(a)(6) . . . .”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
246 Michigan Journal of Private Equity & Venture Capital Law [Vol. 3:231
fessionals; (5) handle funds or securities involved in completing transactions;
or (6) hold themselves out as providing any securities-related service other
than a listing or matching service.101
None of the activities allowed for bulletin boards are prohibited by the
funding portal rules.  As a result, a registered funding portal offering
crowdfunding securities under Section 4(a)(6) could also operate a parallel
bulletin board for securities offerings other than Section 4(a)(6) offerings,
so long as the funding portal clearly delineates which activities are which
and informs investors that the funding portal does not provide any service
other than a listing service on the bulletin board.
Likewise, a registered funding portal may also exist as a donation and
rewards-based crowdfunding platform.102  The basic rationale is that dona-
tion and rewards crowdfunding does not involve the offer and sale of se-
curities,103 and as such does not require compliance with state and federal
securities laws.  None of the activities of donation and reward crowdfund-
ing run afoul of the restrictions placed on registered funding portals.
B. Funding Portals Limited to Objective Criteria to Determine Whether
to Accept Issuers
Funding portals are further limited by the statutory language of the
JOBS Act in regard to the methods by which they choose to accept or
deny issuers that want to list on the funding portal.  The SEC informs
funding portals in the proposed rules that they are not allowed to “curate”
offerings based upon anything but objective criteria.104  This limitation
stems from the statutory prohibition on offering investment advice or rec-
ommendations.105  The curation of companies offering securities to create
101. Angel Capital Electronic Network (“ACE Net”), SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL
636094, at *1 (Oct. 25, 1996). See also IPOnet, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 431821 (July
26, 1996); Progressive Technology, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 1508655 (Oct. 11,
2000).  Because funding portals and bulletin boards are similarly prohibited from providing
investment advice, the analysis for impermissible activities by non-registered bulletin boards
may be informed by the SEC analysis of the proposed rules for funding portals.  For example,
any marketing that merely identifies the listed securities as “high-quality” could result in the
loss of the exemption from registration as impermissible investment advice. See infra Part
IV.B.
102. Indiegogo, a donation and rewards based crowdfunding platform, has indicated
interest in entering the securities crowdfunding space. See JD Alois, Indiegogo CEO Slava
Rubin Talks Equity Crowdfunding, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Dec. 4, 2013, 1:43 PM), http://
www.crowdfundinsider.com/2013/12/27708-indiegogo-ceo-slava-rubin-talks-equity-crowd
funding-video/.
103. However, some pre-sales may fit the definition of a security in states that follow
the “risk capital” definition. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.005(17)(a) (2012) (“‘Secur-
ity’ means any . . . investment of money or other consideration in the risk capital of a venture
with the expectation of some valuable benefit to the investor where the investor does not
receive the right to exercise practical and actual control over the managerial decisions of the
venture . . . .”).
104. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,560 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 227).
105. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(80), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(80) (2012).
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a funding portal of “high quality” or other sorts of passive endorsements
is, in itself, prohibited investment advice.106
This requirement has interesting impacts on the criteria that funding
portals may use to determine which companies issuing securities to list on
its site.  The SEC, cognizant of the significance of this limitation on the
funding portal, has provided a safe harbor for funding portals, the ability
to limit issuers on their sites by applying objective criteria.107  Those crite-
ria must be reasonably designed to result in a broad selection of issuers
offering securities, and be applied consistently to all potential issuers so as
not to recommend or implicitly endorse certain issuers or offerings.108
Funding portal promoters have been concerned about the requirement
that they not curate offerings.109  The concern stems from the belief that
the proposed rules prohibit funding portals from restricting access to issu-
ers that are not ready to raise capital or present risks unsuitable to inves-
tors.  However, funding portals are able to deny access based upon these
concerns.  Proposed Rule 301(c) in fact requires intermediaries, including
funding portals, to deny access to its platform if it believes the issuers of-
fering raises concerns regarding investor protection.110  While funding
portals could deny access to its platform even without a reasonable basis
for believing the issuer raises concerns regarding investor protection,111
funding portals could qualify their beliefs by conducting a thorough due
diligence process prior to the start of an offering.  If that due diligence
program is conducted on an objective, consistent basis, it is reasonable
that such a due diligence program could serve as an assurance that the
funding portal is offering high-quality companies that are ready to raise
capital to its investors.112
C. Determination that the Issuer has Complied with its Obligations
Issuers offering securities under Section 4(a)(6) face a number of con-
ditions in order to qualify for the exemption from registration under Sec-
106. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,486.
107. Id. at 66,560.
108. Id. at 66,486.
109. See The JOBS Act at a Year and a Half: Assessing Progress and Unmet Opportuni-
ties: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, and Investment of the S. Comm.
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 17 (2013) (prepared testimony of Sher-
wood Neiss, Crowdfund Capital Advisors, LLC).
110. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,556 (the SEC has stated that funding portals do
not need a reasonable basis for denying access on these grounds).
111. See id. at 66,463.
112. The SEC has previously indicated that satisfactorily completing objective, pre-of-
fering due diligence as a condition on listing would likely not constitute investment advice.
See Meeting with David Blass, Chief Counsel, Div. of Trading and Markets, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, and other Commission staff, and Sara Hanks, Brian Knight, and Andrew Stephen-
son, CrowdCheck, Inc., in Washington, DC (Sept. 24, 2013) (notes on file with author).
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tion 5 of the Securities Act.113  These conditions, such as filing disclosures
and offering materials with the SEC, not advertising the terms of the offer-
ing, and filing annual reports serve to reduce the risk of fraud present in a
securities offering with limited disclosure requirements.114  As the condi-
tions are meant to limit fraud, it follows that the Section 4A(a)(5) require-
ment of the Securities Act, which compels intermediaries in a
crowdfunding transaction to “take such measures as to reduce the risk of
fraud,” requires that intermediaries confirm whether issuers have com-
plied with their obligations.  This compulsion on intermediaries stems
from both the SEC and FINRA obligations to examine issuers.
1. SEC’s proposed “reasonable basis” requirement
Section 4A(a)(5) of the Securities Act requires that intermediaries
must take such measures to reduce the risk of fraud in Section 4(a)(6)
transactions.115  The SEC understood this requirement as compelling in-
termediaries to be gatekeepers and only allow issuers to go forward if the
intermediary has a “reasonable basis” for believing that the issuer seeking
to offer securities has complied with the requirements of Section 4A(b) of
the Securities Act.116  Additionally, the proposed rules give certainty to
funding portals that they may deny access to the portal if the issuer may
present the potential for fraud or raises concerns about investor protec-
tion.117  Keep in mind, securities fraud is a broader concept than tradi-
tional commercial fraud—omissions necessary to make existing statements
not misleading may constitute securities fraud along with affirmative mis-
representations.118  As such, a portal may reasonably deny access to the
portal if it believes the issuer is not sufficiently disclosing information.
Interestingly, the proposed rules allow an intermediary to accept the
representations of the issuer that it has satisfied its disclosure require-
ments and is eligible to issue securities under Section 4(a)(6).119  While the
SEC has likely included this method as a means for the intermediary to
control costs, merely relying on the representation of the issuer is not a
sufficient means for intermediaries to control the securities law liability
that they may face in Section 4(a)(6) transactions due to the statutory as-
signment of liability on the intermediary for misleading statements and
omissions.  Section 4A(c)(3) expressly extends securities fraud liability to
113. Securities Act of 1933 § 4A(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b) (2012) (as amended by section
302(b) of the JOBS Act).
114. Id.
115. Securities Act § 4A(a)(5), id. § 77d-1(a)(5).
116. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,556.
117. Id. at 66,489.
118. See Securities Act § 4A(c)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c)(2)(A); see also Exchange
Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).
119. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,556. See supra Part II.D.
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the intermediary for statements made by the issuer.120  This section has
strong interplay with the requirement that the intermediary have a reason-
able basis for believing the issuer complies with Section 4A(b) of the Se-
curities Act.  If the issuer does not comply with Section 4A(b), then the
issuer has failed to meet the conditions of Section 4(a)(6) for exemption
from the registration requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act.121
However, liability does not end with the issuer violating Section 5 of the
Securities Act.  The issuer may have misstated material information in its
offering materials in order to claim compliance with the exemption.  In
such a scenario, the intermediary will be liable to any purchasers of the
securities for the misstatements of the issuer under the liability created by
Section 4A(c)(3).
Due to their limited experience with compliance with state and federal
securities laws, funding portals are more likely than brokers to unreasona-
bly rely on the representations of issuers that they are in compliance with
the requirements of Section 4A(b).  As one commenter on the proposed
rules noted, without minimum qualifications, licensing, or examinations, it
is uncertain how much experience and judgment funding portals will have
at their disposal to make appropriate calls on how best to take measures to
reduce the risk of fraud.122
2. FINRA broker due diligence requirements apply to funding portals
Funding portals must adhere to another set of requirements from
FINRA in regards to investigating issuers that approach their platforms.
FINRA has proposed rules for funding portals that reflect the obligations
FINRA broker members have when selling securities issued pursuant to
an exemption for the private placement of securities.  While the FINRA
proposed rules are not nearly as extensive as those for broker-dealers, due
to the limitations on solicitation and investment advice, funding portals
will be subject to FINRA’s rules relating to “commercial honor and just
and equitable principles of trade”123 and prohibitions on “manipulative
and fraudulent devices.”124  In previous FINRA notices, the organization
120. Securities Act § 4A(c)(3) (“the term ‘issuer’ includes . . . any person who offers or
sells the security . . . .”). Intermediaries are sellers of securities. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S.
622 (1988); see also Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,499.
121. The fundamental principle of the Securities Act is that any offer or sale of securi-
ties must be registered or exempt from registration.  Section 4(a)(6) creates such an exemp-
tion from registration, but the requirements of Section 4A(b) must be satisfied to qualify for
the Section 4(a)(6) exemption.  If there is no Section 4(a)(6) exemption, it is likely that the
issuer has violated Section 5 of the Securities Act.
122. Letter from Vic Reichman to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 2,
2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-13/s70913-75.htm (regarding File
Number S7-09-13).
123. FINRA, Proposed Funding Portal Rules § 200(a) (2013) [hereinafter FINRA Pro-
posed Rules], available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/docu-
ments/industry/p369763.pdf
124. Id. § 200(b).
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has stated that a failure of a member to make a reasonable investigation
into a security and the issuer’s representations about the security can con-
stitute a violation of these rules, as well as the SEC’s rules against mislead-
ing statements.125
D. Funding Portals Have a Limited but Important Role When Managing
Communication Channels
Intermediaries in a Section 4(a)(6) offering must establish communica-
tion channels by which prospective investors may communicate with the
issuer and other prospective investors to evaluate the offering as a
crowd.126  For funding portals, the types of activities they may undertake
with regard to communication channels is constrained by the limitations
on funding portal activity, namely the prohibitions on soliciting investors
or providing investment advice.  So as to avoid situations where a funding
portal may cross the line on proper activity, the SEC has proposed that
funding portals be prohibited from participating in the communication
channels it hosts, except for establishing guidelines and removing abusive
or potentially fraudulent communications.127
However, enforcing the guidelines and removing abusive or potentially
fraudulent communications may still trigger the prohibitions on invest-
ment advice.  The SEC seems to focus on potentially fraudulent postings
by individuals associated with the issuer.128  Potentially fraudulent post-
ings by the issuer or associated persons may take the form of hyping the
offering and would generally be easier to enforce against using the guide-
lines.  Thornier situations could arise in the case of persons not associated
with the issuer that are critical of the offering.  Such persons may be pro-
viding accurate information in an incendiary manner that goes against the
communication channel guidelines.  For example, one can imagine a
holder of intellectual property, with a short fuse, fuming that the issuer is
currently violating the holder’s intellectual property rights.  If the funding
portal removes such information, could it be liable for providing invest-
ment advice by removing honest criticism?
E. Funding portals must utilize third-parties to close an offering
Funding portals are restricted to accepting investment commitments
from potential investors for securities offering on the funding portal’s plat-
form.129  They may not hold, manage, possess, or handle investor funds
125. See FINRA REGULATORY NOTICE 10-22, OBLIGATION OF BROKER-DEALERS TO
CONDUCT REASONABLE INVESTIGATIONS IN REGULATION D OFFERINGS (Apr. 2010), availa-
ble at  http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p12130
4.pdf.
126. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,557.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 66,560.
129. See id. at 66,561.
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and securities.130  This statutory requirement is broad, and prompted the
SEC to provide guidance through its safe harbor provision of the proposed
rules.131  Simply, any funding portal must rely on third-party entities that
can accept investor funds and hold them in escrow until released, as well
as handling the clearance and settlement of the securities.  This require-
ment creates additional transaction costs for funding portals.
V. LEGAL LIABILITY OF INTERMEDIARIES IN SECTION 4(A)(6)
TRANSACTIONS
A. Intermediaries Have Primary Liability for Material Misstatements by
the Issuer
The statutory language of the JOBS Act expressly sets out the liability
imposed on issuers for making false or misleading statements and omis-
sions.  Section 4A(c) provides that an issuer, including its officers and di-
rectors, will be liable to the purchaser of its securities in a transaction
under Section 4(a)(6) if the issuer makes an untrue statement of a material
fact or omits to state a material fact required to be stated or necessary in
order to make the statements, in light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading.132  The company and its officers and di-
rectors bear the burden of proof with this respect to this liability: they
must show that they did not know and, in the exercise of reasonable care,
could not have known of the misleading statement or omission.133
However, intermediaries should be aware that the statute defines “is-
suer” as “any person who offers or sells the security in such offering.”134
As noted by the SEC, under the requirements of Section 4(a)(6) transac-
tions, intermediaries offer and sell securities.135  As such, under this defi-
nition all intermediaries in Section 4(a)(6) transactions are primarily liable
for the material misstatements and omissions of the issuers that list on
their platforms.
The SEC appears comfortable extending primary liability to in-
termediaries in Section 4(a)(6) transaction because of the operating re-
quirements already in effect for brokers and proposed for funding portals
in the proposed rules.  The SEC believes intermediaries are in a position
to exercise reasonable care to eliminate materially false or misleading in-
formation.136  In a requirement similar to that of brokers, proposed Rule
403(a), the SEC would require funding portals to implement policies and
procedures reasonably designed to achieve compliance with the federal
130. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(80)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(80)(D) (2012);
Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,556.
131. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,561.
132. Securities Act of 1933 § 4A(c)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c)(2)(A) (2012).
133. Id. § 4A(c)(2)(B).
134. Id. § 4A(c)(3).
135. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,499.
136. Id. at 66,531.
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securities laws.137  Such policies and procedures could include due dili-
gence beyond conducting background checks by verifying the statements
made by an issuer prior to posting the issuer’s offering materials to the
intermediary’s platform.  While this type of due diligence would go be-
yond the affirmative requirements for intermediaries set out in proposed
Rule 301(a),138 the intermediary would be accepting a significant amount
of business risk by not conducting such due diligence on each issuer.
It is important to note that Section 4A(c) adds liability to an area of
securities law that is already subject to extensive liability at both the fed-
eral and state levels.  Intermediaries face potential liability for violations
of other anti-fraud rules and statutes of previously existing securities law.
For instance, intermediaries would continue to face potential liability for
manipulative or deceptive practices or misleading statements that they
have ultimate control of under Exchange Act Rule 10b-5.139  Also, as enti-
ties that “willfully participate[ ]” in an offering, intermediaries would be
liable for the false or misleading statements by the issuer made to induce a
securities transaction under Section 9(a)(4) of the Exchange Act.140  Ad-
ditionally, many state anti-fraud rules subject intermediaries to liability for
aiding and abetting securities law violations of issuers.141
B. FINRA Obligations Faced by Brokers and Funding Portals
In addition to SEC liability for securities law violations, FINRA im-
poses liability on funding portals and broker-dealers that violate the
FINRA rules of conduct.  Under FINRA Rules 2010, 2020, and proposed
funding portal Rule 200, brokers and funding portals are required to ob-
serve high standards of commercial honor and must avoid engaging in ma-
nipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent devices.142  Additionally,
proposed funding portal Rule 200 prohibits a funding portal from includ-
ing on its website information from an issuer that the portal knows or has
reason to know contains any untrue or misleading statement.143
137. Id. at 66,561.
138. See supra Part II.D.
139. Exchange Act Rule 10b-5(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2013); see also Janus Capi-
tal Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
140. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 9(a)(4), 9(f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(a)(4), (f); see
Roger Wiegley, New Liability Exposure for Intermediaries in Private Placements, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Aug. 21, 2011, 9:40 AM), http://blogs.law.
harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/08/21/new-liability-exposure-for-intermediaries-in-private-place-
ments/.
141. See, e.g., Jennifer Johnson, Secondary Liability for Securities Fraud: Gatekeepers in
State Court, 36 DEL. J. OF CORP. L. 465 (2011).
142. FINRA Manual, supra note 67 (Rules 2010, 2020); FINRA Proposed Rules, supra
note 121, §§ 200(a)-(b).
143. FINRA Proposed Rules, supra note 123, § 200(c)(3).
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VI. GOING FORWARD
A. Predictions on What the SEC Will Do
In many respects, the proposed rules issued by the SEC are rather con-
servative and do not stray far from the original requirements of the stat-
ute, even where the SEC was given latitude to modify requirements.  For
instance, the proposed rules do not amend the dollar categories for re-
quired financial statements,144 and individual investor funding limita-
tions.145  Even the disclosures requirement of Form C does not expand
significantly upon the the statutory requirements.146  Funding portals
should not expect the SEC to reduce the compliance requirements of the
proposed rules.  As financial intermediaries, funding portals will be faced
with the requirements that accompany that status, including recordkeep-
ing,147 protecting customer privacy,148 and compliance with anti-money
laundering rules.149  In order to protect investors and to prevent unscrupu-
lous actors from participating in Section 4(a)(6) offerings as funding por-
tals, the SEC will likely maintain those requirements.
B. Unanswered Questions and Considerations for Issuers
and Intermediaries
The proposed rules for Regulation Crowdfunding were eagerly antici-
pated by presumptive market participants, but even if adopted as is there
would remain several areas of ambiguity that could impact the likelihood
of Section 4(a)(6) offerings going forward.
1. Will anybody enter the space strictly as a funding portal?
One of the JOBS Acts most significant innovations is the creation of a
new type of regulated entity—the funding portal.150  However, it remains
unknown whether the new entity will thrive in the new market, or whether
the traditional broker-dealer will remain the dominant player.  While
funding portals may ultimately have a lower regulatory barrier to entry,
and can charge success fees and transaction-based compensation like
traditional broker-dealers,151 they lack the ability to undertake many of
the activities broker-dealers use to attract investors, such as the ability to
144. Compare Securities Act of 1933 § 4A(b)(1)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(1)(D) (2012),
with Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,553 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 227).
145. Compare Securities Act § 4(a)(6)(B), with Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,551.
146. Compare Securities Act § 4A(b)(1), with Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,552.
147. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,561.
148. Id.
149. Id.; Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 31 C.F.R. Chapter X (2013) (Part
1023 establishes the rules for brokers or dealers in securities that would apply to funding
portals as well).
150. See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 304(a)(1), 126 Stat. 306, 321 (2012).
151. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,458 (Brokers and Funding Portals).
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advertise companies directly to investors by name.  They are also unable
to augment Section 4(a)(6) raises with other potentially larger and more
lucrative types of offerings (e.g., offerings under Rule 506(c) of Regulation
D152), denying them the ability to completely service companies seeking to
do a Section 4(a)(6) offering as a “side-car” to a larger raise and amortize
their compliance costs across raises.  These limitations on the revenue
streams for funding portals would seem to limit their profitability relative
to broker-dealers, placing them at a disadvantage.
Another challenge facing all platforms seeking to intermediate Section
4(a)(6) raises, but likely to be felt most acutely by funding portals, is the
lack of clarity regarding certain intermediary requirements.  We assume
funding portals will feel this most acutely because their principals are
likely to be less experienced and therefore more likely to misjudge the
somewhat nebulous “reasonable basis” standard intermediaries must meet
for determining whether an issuer poses a threat of fraud or has sufficient
capability to keep track of their shareholders.  While broker-dealers are
presumably both more experienced on these issues and have the potential
for greater revenue from other means of offerings to use to address com-
pliance issues, funding portals may find themselves having to meet the
same regulatory burdens with fewer resources.  Improved guidance on
how a platform may meet its obligations could limit the advantage enjoyed
by broker-dealers.
Given this environment, it is questionable whether for-profit busi-
nesses will enter the market as pure funding portals, instead preferring to
become or partner with a broker-dealer, leaving the funding portal entity
viable for only non-profits and other entities less concerned with financial
return.
2. Will any company want to take on the disclosure and
reporting requirements?
Another outstanding question is whether companies seeking invest-
ment will utilize Section 4(a)(6), given the significant disclosure and re-
porting requirements, which are both considerable and vague.  For
example, the proposed rules require that issuers provide to the public and
SEC, via EDGAR, certain information related to the raise.153  However, it
is unclear whether the information required to be provided to the SEC
includes all of the offering materials of the issuer provided to the platform
or only the select list specified by the regulation.  While the SEC will
hopefully clarify what it expects issuers to provide, the current uncertainty
may limit issuers’ willingness to risk either unnecessarily over-disclosing or
failing to provide all required information.
152. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2013).
153. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,552–55.
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Likewise, the ongoing reporting requirements proposed in the JOBS
Act154 and the proposed rules155 present a question for the viability of
securities crowdfunding.  Will companies accept the ongoing, and poten-
tially significant, costs to comply with disclosure requirements for what are
ultimately fairly modest sums of money?  In particular, the proposed re-
quirement that a company that raises over $500,000 undergo a yearly audit
until the securities are retired or repurchased156 could render Section
4(a)(6) offerings too inefficient for all but the most desperate of compa-
nies.  However, the ongoing audit requirement is not required by the
JOBS Act and may be modified in the final rule, so ultimately this may not
be an issue.
3. Will any investors show up?
Of course, no matter how good Section 4(a)(6) may be for issuers on
paper, if investors do not take an interest, the issue (in both senses of the
word) is moot.  For investors the primary concern is likely to be the quality
of the companies seeking to raise money and whether investors feel they
can avoid being fleeced and get the return they are looking for (be it finan-
cial or simply psychological).  Of course, the best way investors can assess
whether an issuer presents such an opportunity is through good quality
disclosure.  While market competition and intermediaries should improve
disclosure similar to what investors have demanded in other unregistered
securities offerings, the regulatory environment is also likely to play a role.
Fulsome disclosure obligations and clarity as to the scope of those obliga-
tions should help investors set their expectations, know what information
to look for, and detect red flags.  It will also help issuers and in-
termediaries structure their disclosure and offering materials to be as ef-
fective as possible at attracting investors while complying with the law.
VII. CONCLUSION
The proposed rules for securities crowdfunding elaborate upon the
statutory requirements for intermediaries conducting Section 4(a)(6) of-
ferings.  Section 4(a)(6) presented a challenge to the SEC because the gen-
eral intent was to create a new, less expensive means to raise capital under
federal securities law.  However, that new structure must still fit within
existing law and meet the requirements that are imposed on any registered
financial intermediary.  While the proposed rules have their share of dis-
contents, in many cases the areas of consternation were compelled by the
statute, which limited the SEC’s ability to change them.  The overarching
securities law of the United States places certain obligations on in-
termediaries, including those participating in crowdfunding.  Accepting
this burden is the condition of being allowed to join the game in the first
place.
154. JOBS Act § 302(b)(4).
155. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,554.
156. Id. at 66,486.
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